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From the Social Charter to the Social
Action Program 1995-1997: European
Union Employment Law Comes Alive
Donald C. Dowling, Jr.*
I. Employment Costs Play a Key Role in the Success of a Business
Operating Within the European Union
As trade becomes increasingly global, and as Western Europe attains an
increasingly important position in the world market, businesses based
outside of Europe increasingly view the European Union (EU) as a key
market. The world's major multinational businesses have, of course, oper-
ated in Europe for decades, but many smaller companies based outside
Europe only now find themselves attracted to the EU's single market.
These companies are exporting goods to Europe and setting up direct oper-
ations such as distributorships, branch offices, joint ventures, and manu-
facturing or service operations within the EU Member States.'
Traditionally, multinational businesses transferring direct employ-
ment operations abroad have moved into "third world" countries to take
advantage of cheap labor.2 The motive for expanding operations in the
European Union, however, is to gain access to the EU's wealthy 380 million
"first world" consumers.
The wealth of Europe's consumers comes from Europe's employers.
Northern European workers earn higher hourly wages than U.S. and Japa-
nese workers, and they enjoy broader levels of benefits.3 However, the
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1. See, e.g., Lindley H. Clark, Jr., Europe '92? It's Mostly a Break for Americans,
WALL ST. J., May 31, 1990, at A18.
2. U.S. businesses' suspected goal of saving labor costs by moving employment
operations to a lower wage country was the chief U.S. controversy surrounding the North
American Free Trade Agreement. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Mexican Free-Trade Issue is
Putting Unusual Cross-Pressures on Lawmakers in Both Parties, WAIL ST. J., May 22, 1991,
at A16.
3. While the average U.S. manufacturing wage is $16.17 per hour, Europe's average
is higher, peaking in Germany at $25.94. 143 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 126 (May 31, 1993).
In addition, employer-provided benefits in Europe are generally more generous than
elsewhere, including the United States. In Italy, the rule of thumb is that benefits cost
over 100% of an employee's salary; in the United States, benefits average only about 25%
of salary. Thus, an Italian's salary makes up less than half his total cost to his employer,
while a U.S. worker's salary is about 75% of his cost to his employer. In addition, Euro-
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wealth that makes Europeans ideal consumers renders Europe's employ-
ment climate, from the employer's point of view, especially chilly. 4
Non-European businesses hoping to penetrate the EU market therefore
must choose between cheaper labor and market access.5 To maximize
profitability, anyone doing business in Europe needs to deal with the prob-
lem of controlling employment costs in EU operations.6 Unfortunately,
this goal of minimizing European employment costs runt counter to an
increasingly important aspect of the EU's agenda: harmonizing Member
States' employment ("social"7) laws.
When the European Union originally decided to create its post-1992
single market, it focused largely on the benefits and efficiencies a single
market could bestow upon business.8 The European labor movement,
however, demanded that if business was to benefit from a single market,
then workers also deserved some new advantages.9 Europe's social mavens
(organized labor and Europe's strong socialist parties) demanded a "lowest
common denominator" of employee rights, which would apply throughout
pean workers clock substantially fewer hours per year than their U.S. counterparts. As a
result, European businesses need to employ more people to get the same output. See
Amity Shlaes, "Re-Employment" That Kills Jobs, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1994, at A18. See
also infra note 120.
4. Cf. Donald C. Dowling, Jr., How the EC Could Be An Employment Services Market,
Eu. L. & STRAT., Nov. 1992, at 1; Donald C. Dowling, Jr., "L'Europa Sociale": II Punto di
Vista delle Imprese Multinazionali USA, INDusTR A E SiNDACATO, June 28-July 5, 1991, at
16.
5. The political dynamic is essentially identical to the employment policy debate
that raged in the United States prior to the ratification of the North American Free Trade
Agreement when U.S. business, Mexican business, and the presidents of the United
States and Mexico all argued that NAFTA would boost the economics of the signatory
countries. At that time, organized labor and influential businessman Ross Perot strongly
opposed the treaty, arguing that it would take away American jobs. As a compromise
embodied in a side-agreement to NAFTA, the treaty parties set up a formal structure for
policing one another's enforcement of employment laws. The U.S. labor movement was
unable to argue for a strengthening of substantive employee protections within the signa-
tory countries' labor laws, because the United States, with the least worker-friendly labor
law system of the three NAFTA signatories, had little ground to stand on.
6. See generally CEPS MACROECONOMIC PoLIcy GROUP, EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS:
A LONC-RUN VIEW (1990).
7. The word "social" in Eurospeak is virtually synonymous with "employment" in
American usage.
8. Cf. DESMOND DINAN, EvER CLOSER UNION? AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN
ComuNrrY 368 (1994) ("by giving European industry a political program on which it
could finally base concrete action plans for restructuring operations, for increasing
economies of scale, and for improving the efficient use of vital resources, completion of
the [European] single market became an integral part of the Community's industrial
strategy") (internal punctuation and foomote omitted).
9. EC employers' counter-argument to this point was that the single market does
not benefit European business. The breakdown of national trade barriers increases com-
petition, which hurts previously-protected industries. See, e.g., European Employer
Group Cites Business Perils of Single Market, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 94, at A-4 (May
15, 1990) (Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, Secretary-General of UNICE, the Union des Confedera-
tions de lIndustrie et des Employeurs d'Europe, arguing that contrary to frequent asser-
tions otherwise, the single market program is a "kick in the backside" for EC businesses
because "[i]ncreased competition within the [EC] market will expose 'weak companies
for what they are'").
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the European Union, from Germany and Denmark to Portugal and
Greece. 10 Such a plan would provide a minimal level of employee protec-
tion and leave Member States free to bestow even more generous rights.
The social mavens' arguments have proven especially persuasive in the
worker-friendly atmosphere of the Brussels "Eurocracy."
All major business deals with Europe will involve, either directly or
indirectly, significant employment costs. Europe's high employment costs
are not only due to the laws of economics; they also result from Europe's
intrusive employment laws, which amount to "unfunded mandates" (bor-
rowing from U.S. political jargon) on everyone who employs Europeans.
Transactional lawyers representing clients doing business in the Euro-
pean Union must be especially vigilant to spot in advance the key Euro-
pean employment law issues. Missing these issues can cost clients dearly.
Even large, well-known multinationals have made expensive mistakes by
failing to investigate European employment laws prior to closing a
transaction.11
Merely structuring a deal in a manner that places all the employment
burdens onto a native European party through a licensing, agency, or dis-
tributor arrangement, or through certain joint ventures, will never com-
pletely skirt the effects of European employment laws. Europe's high
employment costs and restrictive employment laws impose indirect (some-
times even hidden) costs and concerns which affect transactions structured
this way.12 Companies based outside Europe which want a presence in the
European Union simply cannot escape the high price of admission.
II. The Three Tiers of Employment Law Issues in European Deals
Europe's high employment costs and restrictive employment laws mean
that businesses based off the continent need to know up front the employ-
ment-law ramifications of their European deals. Unfortunately, research-
ing employment law in this context is a triple undertaking. Three tiers of
employment law cover a non-European-based employer's obligations in the
European Union: (1) the extraterritorial effect of home-country employ-
ment law, (2) the specific European Member State's employment laws, and
(3) the EU's growing body of Brussels-level "social" law.
10. Europe's social mavens generally seek to have the European Union enact legisla-
tion which sets a minimum baseline of employee protection, leaving Member States free
to regulate employers more stringently. The social mavens seek to avoid a "race to the
bottom," by which Member States would relax existing employee-protective laws to com-
ply with, but not exceed, the harmonizing European instrument.
11. See, e.g., Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Preparing for the Internationalization of U.S.
Employment Law Practice, 43 LAB. LJ. 350, 352, 355 (1992); Nancy Honig & Donald C.
Dowling, Jr., How to Handle Employment Issues in European Deals, 13 Paavmmvz L. REP.
3, 6-7 (Spring 1994); Lab. L. Rep. Insight (CCH) No. 398, Issue 91 (Apr. 1994) (inter-
view with Donald C. Dowling, Jr.).
12. See sources cited supra note 11.
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A. Tier 1: Extraterritorial Application of Domestic Employment Laws
A non-European business completing a deal in the European Union first
needs to account for the extraterritorial reach of its home-country employ-
ment laws. This is especially critical for U.S. businesses, because the
United States extends the reach of its domestic employment laws especially
far by world-wide standards.
The chief U.S. anti-discrimination laws apply to foreign workplaces
"controlled" by U.S. companies. 13 However, these employment laws only
protect those overseas workers who carry U.S. passports. For example, if
the McDonald's on the Champs-Elysees fired all its employees over age
forty, only affected U.S. citizens could sue under U.S. law.14
B. Tier 2: Member State Law
Even as the European Union increasingly regulates employment issues at
the Brussels level, internal Member State law remains the starting point for
determining which employment rules control a given European workplace.
These employment laws vary greatly within the EU Member States. Basic
employment rules-including minimum wage, firing restrictions, severance
pay requirements, and union organization laws-remain purely a function
of Member State law.15
Differences among the Member States hamper multinational employ-
ers hoping to streamline trans-European employment operations. A well-
known U.S. CEO, Victor Kiam, has stressed that these differences inhibit
the viability of the single European market itself:
In Britain, sales representatives can be terminated with 90 days' notice. In
Italy, the law doesn't let us dispose of reps so easily. They, in effect own
their territory. To fire a rep requires paying a penalty based on the rep's
anticipated earnings over a long period of time. In France, anyone who gets
fired must receive severance pay, an amount borne solely by the company.
In Britain, when a worker is made 'redundant' the government picks up part
of the check.16
Kiam's lament is well founded. According to one cynic, "if all Europe's
labor laws were laid end to end there would be no end."17 Any multina-
tional doing a deal in Europe must therefore anticipate the effects of each
Member State's national employment laws.
13. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(h), 630(0 (1994);
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1211(4) (1988).
14. U.S. businesses involved in European deals often assign at least some U.S.
employees abroad as expatriates. Often these are highly-compensated management and
technical workers.
15. See EUROPEAN LABOR COURTS: CuRRENT ISSUES 47-82 (Werner Blank ed., 1989)(comparative overview of seven European countries' systems regulating "disputes con-
cerning termination of employment").
16. Victor Kiam, Fortress Europe 1992? Don't Hold Your Breath, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11,
1989, at A18.
17. JACK PE., THE REAL PowER GAmE: A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN INDUsTRIAL RELATONS
168 (1974).
Vol. 29
1996 EU Employment Law Comes Alive
The various Member State employment laws come into play as early in
a deal as the site-selection stage. For example, Mediterranean countries
typically have lower wage rates than their Northern European counterparts.
However, Mediterranean countries, such as Spain and Italy, also impose
some of Europe's highest severance pay obligations and have especially
restrictive rules prohibiting firings. On the other hand, northern States,
such as Germany and the Netherlands, have far-reaching laws requiring
employers to allow workers to participate in management decision-making.
Non-European companies planning to merge, open an office, or structure a
joint venture on the Continent must account for these differences in
employment laws before selecting the Member State for a new facility.
Once a company chooses a European site, Member State employment
laws remain an issue when choosing the form of business. For example, a
key difference between the German Aktengesellschaft [AG] and Gesellschaft
mit beschrankter Haftung [GmbH] is the type of worker participation obliga-
tions which these corporate forms impose.' 8
Even as Brussels develops a new body of EU-level employment law, the
European Union's unique legal structure requires lawyers to keep their
focus on the Member States' internal employment laws. Almost all EU
social instruments are "directives," which come into force only when each
Member State individually implements them according to its own "choice
of form and methods."19
For example, the EU employment law directive which covers maternity
leave merely sets out a "lowest common denominator" which each Member
State's internal laws must meet; each Member State is free to offer greater
protection to pregnant women.20 If, therefore, a U.S. company plans to
acquire offices in Greece and Austria and wants to know what maternity
leave regulations apply within each State, reading the EU maternity leave
directive will not answer the question. The directive is merely a framework
statement addressed to Greece, Austria, and all the Other Member State
governments. The Greek and Austrian maternity laws, even if both coun-
tries have legally implemented the EU maternity directive, may well differ
from each other substantially.
C. Tier 3: European Union Law
The Member States are therefore the primary source for employment law
applicable in Europe. According to the Commission, "[t]otal harmonisa-
tion [sic] of social policies is... not an objective of the Commission or the
Union."21 Nevertheless, over time Brussels will more comprehensively reg-
18. Cf. Donald C. Dowling, Jr., How Does Europe Regulate Power Within Its Corpora-
tions? What Might the Answer Mean for the U.S.?, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 601, 614
(1992) (book review).
19. TREATY EsTABLISH NG THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC ComuNnv [EC TREATY] art. 189,
amended by TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, 31 LL.M. 247 (1992).
20. See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
21. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Medium Term
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ulate employment issues at the EU level. Indeed, proposed and current EU
employment law instruments already have had far-reaching effects on Euro-
pean business. For example, the recently-enacted Works Council directive
on "worker participation" forces even non-unionized companies to grant
employee representatives a voice in corporate management.22 But this
directive covers only employers "with at least 1,000 employees within the
Member States," including 150 or more employees in each of at least two
Member States.23 The representative of a U.S. corporation that plans to
establish a European presence which might one day employ 1,000 Europe-
ans needs to account for this directive. If legal counsel for such a corpora-
tion ignores this law and its "150 employee" clause, the company
unwillingly could enter into a restrictive worker participation obligation. 24
III. An Overview of EU Employment Law
In its attempt to harmonize Member State laws, the European Union seeks
to establish at least a base level of protection for employees. For example,
in the future a worker from Finland should be able to take a job in Portugal
and keep the same package of employment law protections, including simi-
lar rights to pay and benefits, that he had back home.25 However, move-
ment toward this goal has begun in earnest only recently.26
A. The "European Model" of Employment Relations
The civil (code-based) legal systems, which govern continental EU coun-
tries, contain employment law traditions markedly different from those in
Social Action Programme 1995-1997, COM(95)134 final at 2 [hereinafter Social Action
Program 1995-1997].
22. See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 198.
24. For an overview of EU-level social law with an emphasis on its emerging rele-
vance, see BEVERLY SPRINGER, THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF 1992: EUROPE FACES A NEW EC
(1992). See generally Roger Goebel, Employee Rights in the EC: A Panorama from the
1974 Social Action Program to the Social Charter of 1989, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
R .1 (1993).
25. The European Union has stressed recently that in the employment arena, as in
other areas, it will respect the doctrine of "subsidiarity," i.e., Member States should regu-
late all areas, including matters of employment policy, which are more appropriately
addressed at the local (Member State or regional) level. Cf. George Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the EC and the U.S., 94 COLUM. L. Rev. 332 (1992);
Terence Stewart & Delphine Abellard, Labor Laws and Social Policies in the EC After 1992,
23 LAW & Po'Y INr'L Bus. 507,577-78 (1992); W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle
in European Union Law-American Federalism Compared, 27 CASE W. RES. J. Ir'L. L. 61
(1995). The problem of interpretation concerns the concept of "appropriateness." Brus-
sels has most often determined that specific employment issues are most appropriately
regulated at the EU level.
26. A small but important set of employment doctrines has long been part of Euro-
pean law. For example, the right to equal pay for men and women has been part of the
EC Treaty since its inception in 1957. EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 119. Another
important employment issue, worker participation in management, has been debated by
scholars and practitioners for decades, but has only recently obtained the force of law.
See infra notes 185-208 and accompanying text.
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the United States.27 European employment laws, even in Britain, are
largely a product of legislated rights affirmatively assuring long-term job
security and dignified work conditions. 28 Unlike the common law employ-
ment-at-will concept (still the starting point for non-union employment
relationships in the United States), European employment of undefined
duration effectively includes an implicit assurance of unlimited job
tenure.29
This assurance goes well beyond that found in U.S. anti-discrimina-
tion legislation. In Europe, even non-union workers are typically parties to
written employment contracts. These agreements raise to the level of law
many important aspects of the employment relationship, including man-
agement's right to assign overtime and its right to fire people.30 As
opposed to the current U.S. practice, workers employed under the "Euro-
pean model" of employment relations often expect either to keep their jobs
as long as they want or be bought out at a high price.31 While the U.S.
anti-discrimination model protects only certain classes of workers (based
on their age, sex, race, religion, and disability), Europe's employment laws
are more democratic in that they protect everybody.
B. "Social Europe" Through the Social Charter
Conceptually, a "common" or "single" trade market includes both a unified
market for goods and a unified market for services, including the services
needed to produce goods.32 Accordingly, since the very beginnings of the
European Community (EC), the EC Treaty and the early instruments under
it have regulated a few notable areas of employment law-including equal
27. See, e.g., EUROPEAN LABOUR COURTS: CuRmrr IssUEs, supra note 15; THE MAKING
OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NINE COUNTRIES UP TO 1945 (B.
Hepple ed., 1986); PEEL, supra note 17.
28. See, e.g., COMPARATIV LABOUR LAW 115-76 (W. Butler et al. eds., 1987); Pilar
Cavero, Labour Law and Social Security, in BUSINESS LAw GUIDE TO SPAIN 399430 (Bufete
Cuatrecasas ed., 2d ed. 1994).
29. Internal and External Adaptation of Finns in Relation to Employment,
COM(87)229 final at § VII (May 13, 1987) [hereinafter Internal and External Adaption]
(discussing the "traditional [EU] unlimited employment contract") (emphasis added).
See also EUROPEAN FOUNDATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AN WORKING CONDI-
TIONS, NEw FoRMs OF WORK 36-91 (1988) (analysis of trends in European employment
contracts); Ramm, Model of a European Individual Employment Contract, in COMPARATVE
LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 378, 381 (R. Blanpain ed., 1982) (model of typi-
cal European employment contract explicitly states that "duration" of employment is
"indefinite"); Drovin, Germany's Job Straigacket, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1990, at A16 (in
Germany "[h]igh levels of job protection... restrict dismissals").
30. See sources cited supra note 29.
31. See sources cited supra note 29. For a Member State by Member State summary
of Europe's national employment laws, see LABOUR LAw CoMMrrEE OF THE SECTION ON
BUSINESS LAwV OF THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON CON-
TRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT (1988 & Supp. 1994).
32. This is especially true under U.S. jurisprudence, whereby the Constitution's
"interstate commerce clause," which gives the federal government jurisdiction to regu-
late free trade among the states, has been held to encompass authority to regulate
employment law. Accordingly, all important U.S. employment legislation is at the fed-
eral, not state, level.
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pay for men and women, prohibition of sex discrimination, harmonization
of workplace safety standards, and basic coordination of social security
rules. 33 Simultaneously, Brussels has long worked to ensure the free move-
ment of Member State workers and the cross-border recognition of Euro-
pean certifications and diplomas.34 However, beyond these areas, Brussels
for decades stayed out of the business of regulating employment. Even
after 1974, when the Community issued a widely-heralded policy docu-
ment called the 1974 Social Action Program, Brussels failed to implement
any sweeping agenda of Community-wide employment regulation.35 There
was no coherent body of EC social law up through the 1980s.
The Single Market Program, born with the Commission's June 14,
1985 "White Paper" to the Council, set forth a concrete agenda for a single
European market.36 The White Paper's Single Market envisioned eliminat-
ing three categories of "barriers" dividing the Member States: physical bar-
riers, technical barriers, and fiscal barriers. While the White Paper
fleetingly addressed a need to achieve a social as well as economic union,37
the document conspicuously omitted a category for social barriers.38
The 1986 Single European Act implemented the White Paper by
amending the Treaty, thereby raising the Single Market Program to the
functional equivalent of European constitutional law.39 However, the Sin-
gle European Act, like the White Paper, largely ignored the Single Market
Program's social side. Accordingly, while the Single European Act spurred
the rapid development of a single European market, little happened at first
to create any single employment market. In fact, the Single European Act's
greatest innovation-the "qualified majority" Council voting system-
expressly excluded social matters.4° The Single European Act retained the
cumbersome unanimous voting rule for all employment issues except those
involving worker health and safety.41 Thus, while the texts of both the
White Paper and the Single European Act pay homage to the importance of
"social Europe,"42 these documents effectively put trade matters ahead of
33. See generally Goebel, supra note 24, at 73-81.
34. Cf. Janice Bellace, Employment Protection in the EEC, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 413
(1984).
35. See Goebel, supra note 24, at 16-55. Council Resolution of 21 January 1974
Concerning a Social Action Program, 1974 OJ. (C 13) 1 [hereinafter 1974 Social Action
Program].
36. Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Council, COM(85)310 final [hereinafter White Paper].
37. Id. cl 20 (emphasizing how single market will strengthen EC "social ... policy").
38. See The European Community's Program for a Single Market in 1992, 89 DEP'T ST.
BuLL. 23, 26 ("[s]ignificant by its absence from the EC's 1985 White Paper was any
mention of social issues, such as workers' rights").
39. Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1 (effective July 1, 1987)
(amending EC Treaty).
40. Id. arts. 14, 16-18. See infra notes 41, 142, 169.
41. Single European Act, supra note 39, art. 18 (unanimity applies to measures
"relating to the rights and interests of employed persons"). Id. art. 118a, J 2 (qualified
majority vote and Parliament "cooperation procedure" apply to instruments involving
"health and safety of workers").
42. White Paper, supra note 36, c 20; Single European Act, supra note 39, arts. 21-23.
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social issues.
The representatives at Brussels carefully considered this organization
of priorities. From the beginning of the Single Market Program, two sec-
tors, Europe's business community 43 and Britain,44 consistently opposed a
cohesive "social Europe." Instead, they advocated a single market limited
to trade in goods, which would leave the Member States free to regulate
employment on their own. In the mid-1980s, social Europe was too volatile
a concept for Brussels to promote openly, because the single market's
future was not yet secure.45 As Brussels undoubtedly suspected from the
beginning, had the European business community and Britain initially
pressed their strong opposition to a social Europe, the entire Single Market
Program might never have materialized, suffering the same fate as the EC
Treaty's push for a common single employment market and the 1974
Social Action Program's attempt to rejuvenate social Europe.46
Although it kept any plans for a social Europe quiet during the Single
Market Program's early, formative years, Brussels devoted its energy toward
making those plans a reality. Social Europe mavens spent the latter part of
the 1980s issuing obscure but visionary papers demanding a social Europe
to parallel the single market for goods, aimed at protecting the jobs of
Northern European workers and preventing the exploitation of
Mediterraneans. 4
7
43. Although European business tends to oppose a comprehensive social Europe,
this generalization cannot be taken too far. Leaders of important European businesses
are often far more socialistic than their U.S. counterparts. For example, Didier Pineau-
Valencienne, CEO of Paris-based electronics conglomerate Groupe Schneider, worries
about international disparities in distribution of wealth, the harmful effects of competi-
tion, and the dangers of "the Adam Smith philosophy." Charles Day, Jr., The Ecstasy Is
Worth the Agony, INDuSmY Wt., Nov. 15, 1993, at 20, 21.
44. As to Britain's historical aloofness from all matters of Europe's social agenda,
see Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, Companies and Employees: Common Law or Social
Dimension?, 109 LAw Q. REv. 220, 262 (1993) ("policies which might do a little to
amend the common law philosophies, such as Community proposals for employee par-
ticipation ... necessarily find themselves embroiled in Britain in a battle with... com-
mon law principles and their dominant ideology, the common law tradition of authority
[in the] work[place]").
45. See, e.g., Philip Revzin, The Road to European Unity-1992: Unity Drive Feeds EC
Bureaucrats' Power, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1989, at A8 (by mid-1989, widespread commit-
ment to the Single Market Program at last allowed "the EC's bureaucrats [to] branc[h]
... fast into previously forbidden areas" including "writing a European Charter of Funda-
mental Social Rights") (emphasis added).
46. See, e.g., Fifth Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment Concerning the Implementation of the White Paper on the Completion of the Inter-
nal Market, COM(90)90 final, at 2 [hereinafter 1990 Report] ("[ilrreversibility and
anticipation have characterized [the EU's] work [toward a single market] in recent,
months").
47. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Worker Rights in the Post-1992 European Communities:
What "Social Europe" Means to United States-Based Multinational Employers, 11 Nw. J.
hNe'L L. & Bus. 564, 585-89 (1992) (discussing social documents after Single Market
Program and before Social Charter). Much of the talk in this era aimed at averting
"social dumping," Eurospeak for the fear that free EC trade would cause industry simul-
taneously to abandon higher-wage northern Europe and to exploit Mediterranean work-
ers by denying them workplace protections and benefits. See also P. TEAGLU, THE
EuRoPEAN COMMUNrY. THE SociAL DIMENSION 77-80 (1989). The EU social dumping
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 29
In 1989, the social Europe movement emerged triumphantly from the
Single Market Program's closet when then-Commission President Jacques
Delors formally called for a cohesive social Europe agenda.48 Late in 1989
the Commission issued a "Social Charter" and an implementing document
now known as the 1989 Social Action Program.4 9 Together these docu-
ments outline a "grand design for regulating workers' pay, conditions, and
rights."50 The 1989 Social Action Program calls for forty-seven specific
instruments which the European Union would have to adopt to create
social Europe. Comprising one of Brussels' first major single market agen-
das unconnected to the White Paper's three-barrier structure, the Social
Charter and 1989 Social Action Program together articulated a comprehen-
sive EU platform on European worker rights which was surprisingly
employer-restrictive, especially by non-European and British standards.5 1
Although the Charter and 1989 Social Action Program had no legal
force-the Charter was labelled a mere "Solemn Declaration," and Britain
had voted against it, apparently vetoing it by blocking unanimous pas-
sage5 2 -these two documents quickly took on a life of their own. By the
concept goes back to League of Nations debates in the 1920s. See COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrTs, DIRECToRATE-GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EDU.
CATION, SOCIAL EUROPE: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET, SPECIAL EDITION
65-66 (1988) [hereinafter SOCIAL EUROPE SP. ED.].
48. Letter fromJacques Delors to Chairman of the Economic and Social Committee
(Nov. 9, 1988), reprinted in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1/90 SOCIAL
EUROPE 80 (1990) [hereinafter SocIAL EUROPE 1/90]. The Economic and Social Commit-
tee (a Treaty-created EU institution) responded by issuing its Opinion of the Economic
and Social Committee on Basic Community Social Rights, 1989 OJ. (C .126) 32. His-
tory, however, has ignored this uninspiring Opinion and has recognized the Social Char-
ter as Europe's first key post-single market social document. Notwithstanding its
substantive competence in social matters, its large and diverse membership, and its
Institution-level status, the Economic and Social Committee has not played a significant
role in molding social Europe.
49. Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, reprinted in COMMIs-
SION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1/90 SOCIAL EUROPE 48 [hereinafter Social Charter]
(issued by Commission on November 29, 1989, and approved by eleven of twelve heads
of state at Strasbourg Council meeting on December 9, 1989); Communication from the
Commission Concerning its Action Programme Relating to the Implementation of the
Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers, COM(89)568 final [hereinafter
1989 Social Action Program]. For contemporary textual analyses of these documents,
see Brian Bercusson, The European Community's Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers, 53 MOD. L. REv. 624 (1990); Dowling, supra note 47, at 590-96; Bob Hepple,
The Implementation of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, 53 MOD. L.
REv. 643 (1990); Kraw, The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers,
13 HAsNGs INT'L & CoMp. L REv. 467 (1990). See generally Mary Dominick, Toward a
Community Bill of Rights: The European Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights,
14 FoRDHAM INT'L L J. 639 (1991) (Charter as "human rights" agenda). For a more
recent analysis of the Charter, see Goebel, supra note 24, at 56-73. For an explanation of
the Charter's peculiar publication history, see id. at 59 n.258.
50. The Federal Devil, THE TIMES (London), June 25, 1991, at 18.
51. "Americans are becoming increasingly nervous about the introduction of social
legislation in Europe, [because it] is counter to American practice, according to an offi-
cial of the American Pharmaceutical Association." Financially Sound, Socially Insecure,
THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1991, at 70, 72.
52. For commentary on the uncertain legal status of the Charter, see Dowling, supra
note 47, at 590-94.
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1990s the Charter and the 1989 Social Action Program had catapulted the
previously obscure EU worker rights question to the level of a hot topic
throughout Europe.53 By then, Brussels could at last openly acknowledge
that its drive toward EU "social cohesion" could "[n]ot be dissociated
from" the White Paper program itself.54 In a matter of just a few years,
social Europe had evolved from a whispered rumor to one of Brussels most
important priorities.'5
While Europe's employers and Britain insisted that the Charter and
1989 Social Action Program had no legal effect, the social mavens (now
including the Commission, the Parliament, Europe's socialists, and the
European Trade Union Confederation) busied themselves drafting the
forty-seven instruments called for by the 1989 Program. The social mavens
quickly figured out that even if the Charter and 1989 Social Action Pro-
gram were legally toothless, the opponents of a social Europe could not
stop the Commission from proposing a series of social instruments which
matched the laws outlined by the 1989 Program.
C. The Maastricht Social Protocol
Meanwhile, during 1990 and 1991, the European Commission completely
rewrote the Treaty of Rome. The Commission wanted to take the next step
beyond the Single Market Program, creating an even more cohesive Europe,
a more democratic and "transparent" Union which would move Europe
into the next logical stage: political integration, full economic integration
(including a common currency), and coordinated integration of foreign
relations and citizenship.' 6 In November 1991, the Council on the Euro-
pean Communities (Council) held an intergovernmental conference ("con-
stitutional convention" in U.S. terminology) at Maastricht, the Netherlands,
where the heads of state congregated to conclude discussions and sign the
Commission's radically revised treaty.' 7
53. See, e.g., id.; More Rights for the Workers, THE ECONOMIST, July 28, 1990, at 60
(Commission's commitment to "social Europe" is "irrepressibl[e]"); Brother, We Just
Missed the 1992 Balloon, THE ECONOMIST, June 23, 1990, at 61 ("[u]nion leaders are
particularly keen on the [ECI social charter").
54. 1990 Report, supra note 46, at 1; see id. at 7, 10 ("[tihe social dimension is
fundamental to the internal market").
55. On the "front burner" status of the EC social agenda in 1990, see, for example,
M. HO.MsrEDT, EMPLOYMENT Poucy (1991); Dowling, supra note 47; Barry Fitzpatrick,
Community Social Law After Maastricht, 21 lIDus. .J. 199 (1992); Emil T. Kirchner, The
Social Framework of the European Communities, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ENCYCLO-
PEDIA AND DIRECToRY 1992, at 109 (1991). Yet in the words of one commentator, "[t]he
social dimension of community policies is currently a sickly infant...." Lord Wedder-
burn of Charlton, supra note 44, at 262.
56. This newly enhanced European Community was dubbed the "European Union."
TaRETY ON EURoPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, art. A, 31 IL.M. 247 (ratified Nov. 1, 1993)
[hereinafter Maastricht]. But cf. id. art. G(A) (replacing term "European Economic Com-
munity" throughout Treaty with "European Community," not "European Union").
57. See generally Sari Laitinen-Rawana, Creating a Unified Europe: Maastricht and
Beyond, 28 INT'L LAW. 973 (1994). On British employment law after Maastricht, see
Georgina Keane, UK Labor Law and the Impact of the EC 4-25 (Aug. 10, 1993) (unpub-
lished American Bar Association manuscript). For a comprehensive discussion of the
Cornell International Law Journal
One key aspect of the Treaty on European Union was a more cohesive
social Europe, called the Maastricht "Social Chapter."58 Surprisingly, the
proposed Social Chapter proved to be the greatest obstacle at the European
Council's actual two-day Maastricht summit meeting.5 9 The controversy
over the Social Chapter, in fact, had the effect of pushing the EU's social
agenda into the forefront of public consciousness as never before.
The Council went to the Maastricht meeting intending to approve the
Commission's new draft treaty in two days. 60 Britain's Prime Minister
John Major, however, was wholly unwilling to accept an earlier version of
the proposed Social Chapter, and the other heads of state refused to amend
the Commission-recommended draft.6 1 After some heated late-night polit-
ical maneuvering, the Council arrived at an unprecedented-and almost
unworkable-Social Chapter compromise. While Britain opted out of the
new Social Chapter entirely, leaving the other Member States to legislate
much European employment policy among themselves, 6 2 the Council
retained its previously existing authority to regulate in the social field.6 3
After Maastricht, the Council could still propose and implement new social
instruments under the old treaty authority, and instruments passed this
way would, as always, cover Britain. However, Maastricht allowed new
employment laws alternatively to be passed under the Britain-less Maas-
tricht Social Chapter, renamed the "Social Protocol" because the recon-
figured agreement was appended to the end of the treaty rather than
incorporated as a chapter within it.64 The Maastricht Treaty's Social Proto-
col in turn incorporates an Agreement on Social Policy Concluded between
the Member States of the European Community with the Exception of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.65 Together these
two social appendices constitute only six of the Maastricht Treaty's 256
pages.6 6
Besides carving Britain out of the new social Europe process, the
Social Protocol sets forth three key innovations. First, it expands the
number of social law subjects on which a qualified majority can pass
instruments. Where the pre-Maastricht Treaty had restricted the qualified
Maastricht Treaty, see DINAN, supra note 8, at 168-93; RALPH H. FoLsoM & MICHEL P.
CLOES, EURoPEAN UNION BusINEss LAw: A GuIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK 21-23
(1995).
58. Actually, the Treaty had always contained a "Social Chapter." EC TREATY, supra
note 19, arts. 117-28.
59. See DmNAN, supra note 8, at 182-83.
60. Id. For an insider's report on the hectic two-day Maastricht Social Chapter nego-
tiations, see Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, European Social Policy After Maastricht (June 23,
1992) (unpublished manuscript by Secretary-General of employers' lobby UNICE).
61. See DiNAN, supra note 8, at 182-83.
62. Protocol on Social Policy, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 LL.M. 357 [hereinafter Social Proto-
col]. A protocol has the same effect as a provision written into the Treaty itself. See EC
TREATY, supra note 19, art. 239.
63. EC TREATY, supra note 19, arts. 117-28.
64. Social Protocol, supra note 62. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., EC Employment Law
After Maastricht: Continental Social Europe?, 27 Irr'L LAw. 7-12 (1993).
65. Social Protocol, supra note 62.
66. Id.
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majority voting mechanism to health and safety topics, the Social Protocol
allows qualified majority voting (specially reconfigured to account for the
absence of Britain) over any issue involving health and safety, working con-
ditions, worker information and consultation, sexual equality, or "the inte-
gration of persons excluded from the labour market."6 7 However,
unanimous voting among the participating Member States remains neces-
sary to pass instruments regarding social security and social protection,
employment contract terminations, collective bargaining, immigration
from countries outside the European Union, and "financial contributions
for promotion of employment and job-creation."6 8
Second, the Social Protocol, for the first time in EU history, grants a
legislative role to the so-called "social partners," the pan-European lobby-
ing associations representing employers (chiefly UNICE, the Union des
Confaderations de l'Industrie et des Employeurs d'Europe) and unions
(chiefly ETUC, the European Trade Union Confederation). 69 In a unique
provision, the Social Protocol requires the Commission to submit all draft
social instruments to the social partners for nine months of consultation
and collective bargaining. 70 During these nine months, the social partners
can either jointly recommend changes to pending proposals or enter collec-
tive agreements on the topic of a proposal, thereby effectively pre-empting
the proposal and rendering it obsolete.71 Also under the Social Protocol, a
Member State can delegate implementation of social instruments to the
social partners within that State, "at their joint request."72
The Protocol's third substantive change to EU social law introduces
affirmative action regarding sexual equality. The text of the original 1957
Treaty of Rome had laid out the basic goal of sexual equality as a straight-
forward ban on discrimination.73 The Social Protocol goes farther by
expressly allowing Member States to "[m]aintai[n] or adop[t] measures
providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for women to
pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages
in their professional careers."7 4
Announcing this new Social Protocol in a press conference on Decem-
ber 11, 1991, then-Commission President Jacques Delors explained that
the "two-tier" approach (all Member States versus all States less Britain)
was the only way Europe could avoid reducing the Charter and 1989 Social
67. Id. art. 2(1).
68. Id. art. 2(3).
69. Id.
70. Id. arts. 3-4. The nine-month period is rumored to have been inspired by the
EU's instrument on pregnancy fights, which had occupied the attention of the EU Com-
mission's social policy Directorate-General V just before the December 1991 Maastricht
meeting. See infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
71. Social Protocol, supra note 62.
72. Id. art. 2(4).
73. EC TarAT, supra note 19, art. 119.
74. Social Protocol, supra note 62, art. 6(3). Ironically, the European Union intro-
duced the affirmative action concept only shortly before the United States experienced a
strong social backlash against it.
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Action Program ideals to a level too weak for the other States to accept. 75
Nevertheless, Delors assured that post-Maastricht social developments
would not be too "avant garde." The participating Member States would
balance two goals: the need to legislate conservatively enough to insulate
the EU's less economically-developed areas with the need to avoid "social
dumping."76
D. Progress Toward the "Social Action Program 1995-1997"
Maastricht bears the unfortunate distinction of being the Community
treaty rewrite with the longest gestation period. Two years elapsed from
the signing of the treaty by the European Council in November 1991 until
its November 1993 effective date after full ratification. During these two
years, the Commission's Directorate-General V drafted many of the forty-
seven proposals called for in the 1989 Social Action Program. Otherwise,
little occurred during this period on the social Europe front.7 7
These two years of relative inactivity resulted in an increased demand
for social change. By late 1993, the 1989 Social Action Program's once-
revolutionary forty-seven proposals seemed within reach, even if only
under the Maastricht Social Chapter's Britain-less social regime. The social
Europe mavens therefore started to demand even more.
By this time the social Europe advocates had captured Europe's atten-
tion. London's The Economist diagnosed "employment and labour-market
policy" as "the most immediate problem facing most EC members."78
Madrid's El Pais declared: "The need substantively to modify the European
labor market is the primary factor giving rise to disharmony among the
Member States."79 The Commission joined in, warning: "[t]here can be no
doubt that the causes and consequences of the high and rising unemploy-
ment in Europe represent the single most serious challenge facing the
Member States today."80 Attempting to remedy this emerging social crisis,
the Commission issued a Community-Wide Framework for Employment,
calling for a new employment agenda by the end of 1994.81
75. See European Community Exempts Britain from Complying with EC Labor Legisla-
tion, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 239, at A-1 (Dec. 12, 1991).
76. Id. For a more detailed analysis of Maastricht by this author, see Dowling, supra
note 64, at 7-11. For a detailed analysis of the legal effect of the Social Protocol, see
Elaine Whiteford, Social Policy After Maastricht, 18 EUR. L. REv. 202 (1993). Regarding
"social dumping," see Dowling, supra note 47, at 581 n.93.
77. During this period, the Council addressed the issue of social Europe with broad
policy statements. Cf. Council Conclusions of 21 December 1992 on the Effective
Implementation and Enforcement of Community Legislation in the Area of Social
Affairs, 1993 OJ. (C 49) 6.
78. The Maastricht Recipe, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1993, at 15-16.
79. Nace la Uni6n Europea en medio de un debate sobre la forma de crear empleo, EL
PAiS (Madrid), Nov. 8, 1993, at 1.
80. Green Paper: European Social Policy, Options for the Union, COM(93)551 final
at 40 [hereinafter Green Paper].
81. Community-Wide Framework for Employment, COM(93)238 final (decrying
"unacceptable levels of unemployment," considering idea of "reducing labor costs," and
calling for "a rolling programme of work, to the end of 1994").
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Amidst this unprecedented attention to social Europe, the political
winds shifted in favor of the employers. Brussels' previous social initia-
tives, even in times of economic recession, had tended to restrict employers'
flexibility and increase non-wage employment costs. The typical European
response to tough economic times and rising unemployment traditionally
had been to spread around existing work by forcing Europe's employers to
cap hours and retain idle workers. However, by the mid-1990s, when
Europe was again suffering through a serious recession with high unem-
ployment,8 2 the prevailing economic thinking changed. Unemployment
became such a serious problem that it shocked even some of Europe's
socialists into believing that European employers needed more workplace
freedoms in order to alleviate unemployment by removing disincentives to
hiring.
During this time, the Commission's personnel underwent a shuffle.
Ireland's Padraig Flynn, an old-school socialist, took his country's seat on
the Commission and received responsibility for the Commission's social
affairs portfolio. Flynn immediately decided to craft a new social affairs
agenda, and, after a public comment period, he issued a Green Paper
detailing his thoughts.83 In July 1994, he supplemented this release with a
Social White Paper.8 4
Somehow Flynn had failed to appreciate the importance of the free-
market turn in Europe's prevailing social thought. Although his writings
emphasize competitiveness, Flynn's Green Paper and Social White Paper
regurgitate the same tired socialist ideals which Brussels had been offering
up for years. Flynn's Green Paper's four objectives are: (1) pass new
employment laws to combat unrestricted competition in the market, (2)
spend on social expenditures in a manner consistent with social goals, (3)
expand overall regulation of the welfare state, and (4) pass social protec-
tion laws providing a minimum, decent level of income to those in dis-
tress.85 Flynn's Green Paper and Social White Paper seek to alleviate
unemployment by expanding worker rights and saddling employers with
even more inflexible workplace restrictions.
In stark contrast to Flynn's Green Paper and Social White Paper, Com-
mission President Jacques Delors-in one of his last important pronounce-
ments in office-required the Commission to issue a Social White Paper on
"Growth, Competitiveness [and] Unemployment" (Competitiveness White
82. The mid-1990s European recession was indeed severe. See Community-Wide
Framework for Employment, supra note 81, § 2.1. By late 1993 Spain suffered an eco-
nomic "paralysis" when unemployment officially hit 22.4%. See La Paralisis de Espaiia,
EL PAs, Nov. 8, 1993, at 24. See also Judith Valentine & Carlta Vitzthum, With Boom
Gone Bust, Spain's Social Agenda Still Haunts Economy, WAll ST. J., June 13, 1994, at Al.
Regarding Germany's troubles in the mid-90's recession, see The Politics of Work, ECONO-
MIsr, May 7, 1994, at 53 (Germany). On employment in Europe generally, see EMPLOY-
MENT IN EUROPE, 1993, COM(93)314 (206-page survey).
83. Green Paper, supra note 80.
84. European Social Policy, A Way Forward For the Union, A White Paper,
COM(94)333 final [hereinafter Social White Paper]. The European Parliament voted to
give qualified backing to this Social White Paper onJanuary 19, 1995.
85. See Green Paper, supra note 80, at §§ I, IV.
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Paper).8 6 Delors's 184-page opus is radically more innovative than Flynn's
Green Paper and Social White Paper; the Competitiveness White Paper
implicitly rejects the traditional "worker rights" approach to social Europe
in favor of a design to create a more competitive and stronger European
economy.8 7 While Delors's Competitiveness White Paper stops short of
advocating a reversal in existing restrictions on employers' freedoms, the
Paper all but ignores Flynn's "worker rights" language in favor of an "all-
boats-rise-with-the-tide" theory championing efforts to redress unemploy-
ment by boosting Europe's economy. The Competitiveness White Paper, in
fact, so ardently advocates macroeconomic reforms that entire sections of
the document are silent on employment policy. Much of the paper reads
like an economics, not a social, text. Delors's Competitiveness White Paper
opens by asking: "Why this White Paper? The one and only reason is
unemployment."8 8 It then advocates a three-point economic plan includ-
ing reduction in public deficits, stable monetary policies, and a guaranteed
adequate rate of return on financial investments. 8 9
By shifting the social Europe focus from workers' rights to economic
success, the Competitiveness White Paper breaks fresh ground. However,
the paper does not trigger a complete U-turn in European social policy.
The Competitiveness White Paper fails to advocate a relaxing of Europe's
already-existing restrictions on employers, and it lacks the support of a
Commissioner who could implement its goals: Delors's term in office
expired shortly after the document was released. 90
Advocating employment reforms even more drastic than those of the
Competitiveness White Paper, UNICE, the European employers' lobbying
organization, issued a detailed position paper in June 1994, declaring:
"[a]bove all, Europe needs firms that are profitable."9 1 The views
expressed in the UNICE paper went beyond the macroeconomic focus of
the Competitiveness White Paper and concentrated sharply on reforming
Europe's employment laws. UNICE championed European competitive-
ness by advocating a "reduc[tion in] labour costs (particularly non-wage
costs), [an increase in] the flexibility of the labour markets and [an
86. Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into
the 21st Century, White Paper, COM(93)700 final [hereinafter Competitiveness White
Paper].
87. For example, the Competitiveness White Paper notes that Europe traditionally
dealt with employment by paying out "public expenditure[s]... on assistance .... A
complete reversal of attitude is required ...." Id. at 15.
88. Id. at 1.
89. Id. at 6.
90. Additionally, despite the new direction offered by the Competitiveness White
Paper, the core sections of the document rely on the old European approach of imposing
responsibility on employers for social harmonization. For example, the Competitiveness
White Paper does not reject the antiquated concept of alleviating unemployment by cap-
ping maximum hours in order to spread around existing work The result is that
employers must pay more of Europe's hefty benefits to a larger payroll. Id. at 149-50.
See generally Sharing the Burden, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 18 (on European propen-
sity to cap hours to reduce unemployment).
91. UNICE, MAMNG EUROPE MORF CoMPETITIvE TowARDs WoRLD CLAss PERmOR.
ANCE iii, 11 (1994).
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upgrade ofl the skills and abilities of employees and the unemployed."9 2
Specifically, UNICE recommended more subcontracting, increased compe-
tition and the introduction of market-type mechanisms, decentralization of
authority from central to lower levels of government, and reducing the cost
of labor.93
At the time of the UNICE release, Bernhard Molitor assembled a task
force called the Independent Expert Group on Legal and Administrative
Simplication, with the goal of "turn[ing] back the regulatory tide in Europe
at large [and] recommend[ing] where to slash away the red tape superim-
posed by EU laws in recent years."94
The pro-employer mood in Europe eventually influenced Social Affairs
Commissioner Flynn. In 1994, Flynn announced that he would now focus
on the quality, rather than the quantity, of employment legislation. He
said: "We are looking for new ways to reconcile the twin objectives of eco-
nomic growth and social progress-a new European model."95 On
April 12, 1995, Flynn issued a new social action program, the Social
Action Program 1995-1997, laying out a three-year social plan which
clearly shows the stamp of Europe's pro-employer mood in the mid-'90s.96
Flynn's plan, however, retains the influence of its author's socialist sympa-
thies. The result is an ambivalent, non-committal document which critics
accuse of "lacking ... teeth."9 7
Rather than demand economic reforms which would stimulate
Europe's economy and induce employment (as Delors's Competitiveness
White Paper would have done), Flynn's Social Action Program 1995-1997
simply dilutes or eliminates many of his earlier calls for far-reaching social-
istic reforms.98 The Social Action Program 1995-1997 largely limits itself
to toothless suggestions of policy "framework initiatives," "priorities," and
"€reflections."99
Specifically, the Social Action Program 1995-1997 creates a loose
three year agenda (a "rolling program") calling for progress in the social
92. Id. at viii.
93. Id. at 18, 24.
94. Martin du Bois, Changing Climate: Dutch Begin Assault on Unemployment with
Deregulation, WALL ST. J. Eun., Apr. 12, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Library,
WSJ-EURO File.
95. David Gardner, Brussels to Reformulate Social Policy, FIN. Tmms (London), May
30, 1994, at 2.
96. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21. Parrotting the Competitive-
ness White Paper's opening focus on unemployment, the Social Action Program 1995-
1997 starts with a section on "Jobs-The Top Priority." For a comparison with the Com-
petitiveness White Paper, see supra text accompanying note 88.
97. Critics: Flynn's Program Targeting Jobs, Workers' Rights Lacks Teeths,
EuRoWATcH, May 5, 1995, at 1.
98. Compare Green Paper, supra note 80 and Social White Paper, supra note 84 with
Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21.
99. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21. Britain's Employment Secre-
tary accused Flynn in the Social Action Program 1995-1997 of "not having abandoned
the old way of thinking-based on regulation and restriction." Julie Wolf, A Special Back-
ground Report on European Union Business and Politics, WALL ST. J. Etu., Apr. 13, 1995,
available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database, WSJ-EURO File.
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area, but with the understanding that "[t]otal harmonization of social poli-
cies ... is not an objective.. .. ",100 The Social Action Program 1995-1997
is roughly divided into five main areas: employment, consolidation and
development of legislation, equality of opportunities between men and
women, an active society for all, and medium term reflection and analy-
sis.101 Adopting a view similar to that espoused in the Competitiveness
White Paper, the drafters of the Social Action Program declare that "the
creation of jobs remains the top priority" and emphasize that "the eco-
nomic and social dimension are in fact interdependent and must ...
advance hand in hand."102 The document even promises to "enable com-
panies to make suggestions about the creation of jobs and the attack on
unemployment."103
IV. The EU Charter's Twelve Employment Law Rights and the Status
of their Implementation
The Competitiveness White Paper introduced a new free-market philoso-
phy to social Europe regulation, which Flynn's Social Action Program
1995-1997 continued to a lesser extent. These documents, however, did
nothing to reverse thirty-seven years of employer-restrictive regulation.
Consequently, the European Commission and European Parliament met in
May 1995 to discuss the continued viability of the Social Charter and 1989
Social Action Program. Flynn's Social Action Program 1995-1997 calls for
a European Social Policy Forum to meet annually to report on the contin-
ued progress of the Social Charter and its twelve worker rights.10 4 Social
Europe in the traditional sense remains alive and well.
The twelve rights set forth in the Social Charter coincide almost
exactly with the areas of employment law which Brussels has regulated to
date. A study of each of these twelve substantive topics follows.
A. Right to Free Movement
The first of the Charter's twelve rights, and therefore the first part of the
social Europe framework, is the right to free movement. As an employment
issue, this concept is non-controversial because, in principle, both w6rkers
and employers support the concept of free immigration within the Euro-
pean Union. The right to free movement is meant to "enabl[e] any worker
to engage in any occupation or profession in the Community in accordance
with the principles of equal treatment as regards access to employment,
100. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 2.
101. Actually the Social Action Program 1995-1997 is divided into 11 topics. Id. at i.
Commissioner Flynn, in a speech, identified five of these topics as the paper's themes.
Speech by Padriag Flynn at the IBEC Social Awareness Campaign Social Policy Seminar,
Dublin (Apr. 28, 1995), reprinted in EUROPEAN UNION Paass RELEASE, Speech/95/81.
102. Compare Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 2, with Competi-
tiveness White Paper, supra note 86, at 1.
103. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 8, § 1.2.6.
104. Id. at 18, § 4.4.2.
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working conditions and social protection in the host country."10 5 The cor-
nerstones of the free movement right are cross-border recognition of diplo-
mas and licenses (so that, for example, a doctor educated and licensed in
Greece can practice in Germany), and cross-border residency rights (so
that, for example, an unemployed Irishman can move to Luxembourg to
accept a job).106
Even the 1985 Single Market Program White Paper had set out ambi-
tious goals for attaining the free movement right, but Brussels was never-
theless slow to implement them. As late as 1991, the Commission
complained: "[T]he completion of work aimed at facilitating mobility still
depends on the extension of recognition of qualifications to all regulated
professions and on the reform of the arrangements under which workers
and their families obtain the right of residence." 0 7 In fact, Brussels' pro-
posals on cross-border recognition of diplomas and licenses and its pro-
posals on residence rights for workers were the only projects in the entire
White Paper program not in place at the close of 1992.108
The Commission proposed just one free movement directive expressly
under the Social Charter itself-the 1991 Proposal for a Council Directive
Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of
Services.10 9 This proposal attempts to deal effectively with competition
problems among service businesses operating across Member State lines,
i.e., the problems that arise when an employer from a low wage Member
State assigns a worker to a temporary posting in a high wage State."10 The
proposal requires that a worker employed in one Member State assigned to
105. Social Charter, supra note 49, cl 2. Curiously, while freedom of movement is the
Social Charter's first right, the 1989 Social Action Program, supra note 49, misplaces it
as the fourth right. The 1989 Social Action Program also reshuffles some of the other
rights. This article follows the ordering of rights in the Social Charter. For a thorough
treatment of the right to free movement in the social context, see Lucre A. CARswELL &
XAVIER DE SARRAU, LAW & Busn, ss IN THE EUROPEAN SINGLE MARKEr 10/3-10/39 (1993).
For discussions of the specific free movement issue of law practice mobility in Europe as
it affects lawyers, see Jonathan Barsade, The Effect of EC Regulations upon the Ability of
U.S. Lawyers to Establish a Pan-European Practice, 28 lrr'iL LAw. 313 (1994). See also
Gregory Siskind, Freedom of Movement for Lawyers in the New Europe, 26 INT'L LAw. 899(1992).
106. See, e.g., Directive 89/48/EEC, 1989 OJ. (L 19) 16; Recommendation 89/49/
EEC, 1989 OJ. (L 19) 24; Directive 92/51/EEC, 1992 OJ. (L 209) 25.
107. Sixth Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
Concerning the Implementation of the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal
Market, COM(91)237 final at 1.
108. According to a 1992 Commission Report,
[t]he only proposals in the White Paper programme which have not been
adopted and will probably not be by the end of [1992] are those relating to the
free movement and residence of workers and the members of their families ....
These proposals have been with the Council since 11 January 1989 without it
having been possible to find a qualified majority in favour of them.
Seventh Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Con-
cerning the Implementation of the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Mar-
ket, COM(92)383 final at 28.
109. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Posting of Workers in the
Framework of the Provision of Services, COM(91)230 final SYN 346.
110. Id. at 4.
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another State for more than three months in a year receive the protection of
the host State's laws regarding work hours, holiday time, minimum wages,
subcontracting, health and safety, pregnancy and child care, and anti-dis-
crimination protections.111 The goal here is to prevent, for example, a Por-
tuguese company from being able to win the low bid on a Danish
construction project, and then staff the job with Portuguese construction
workers earning 1.5 to 3 ecu per hour-when their now out-of-work Danish
counterparts would have earned 13.32 to 18.39 ecu.112
The Maastricht Treaty itself contains a chapter outlining a new "Citi-
zenship of the Union." 113 In addition, Commissioner Flynn's Social
Action Program 1995-1997 calls for a 1996 White Paper on free move-
ment,1 14 and also provides three pages of proposals to encourage free
worker movement via transfers of pension rights, cross-border recognition
of diplomas, and social security for migrant workers. 11
B. Right to Fair Pay
The Charter's second right addresses minimum pay, assuring that employ-
ment "shall be fairly remunerated" at a "decent standard of living."116 In
the European Union, the method of determining a minimum wage is often
more complex than the U.S. model of a lowest legal rate per hour. Some
Member States set minimum wages by collective bargaining agreement con-
sensus (either Member State-wide or industry-wide); other States delegate
minimum rates to Wage Councils or Joint Labor Committees. 11 7 With a
move towards harmonizing at least a minimum rate per hour, the Commis-
sion, in May 1991, issued a modest draft opinion asking each Member
State to adopt its own statutory minimum wage. 118 However, apart from a
1975 recommendation "on the principle of the 40-hour week and the prin-
ciple of four weeks' annual paid holiday," 119 the Council has passed few
instruments directly regulating pay. The inactivity is surely a result of the
wide disparities in wages among the Member States: While Germans earn
on average $25.94 per hour, the Portuguese earn only $5.01 hourly. 120
111. Id. at 21-27.
112. Id. at 5 (showing lowest and highest collective bargaining agreement hourly
wages in the construction industry).
113. Maastricht, supra note 56, title II, art. G, part 2. On March 26, 1995, the
Schengen Group of EU states (the Benelux and Iberian countries plus France and Ger-
many) opened their borders, thereby allowing virtually free movement among those
States. See, e.g., 7 Members of EU Launch Passport-Free Zone, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1995,
at A6. See also Tony Horwitz, Europe's Borders Fade, and People and Goods Can Move
Freely, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1993, at Al.
114. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 13, § 3.3.1.
115. Id. at 12-15, §§ 3.01-3.4.2.
116. Social Charter, supra note 49, cl 5.
117. See generally Social Charter, supra note 49.
118. Opinion on the Introduction of an Equitable Wage by the Member States, (SEC
91) 2116 (1991).
119. Recommendation 74/457/EEC, 1975 OJ. (L 199) 32.
120. 143 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 126 (May 31, 1993). According to a 1991 study, total
average hourly compensation cost employers $24.39 in Germany, $16.10 in France, and
$15.40 in the United States. See, e.g., Bruce Nelan, As Europe's Ethnic Mix Begins to
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When the laws of economics create disparities this great, the laws of gov-
ernments are virtually powerless to legislate change.
C. Right to Improved Working Conditions
The Charter's third right seeks to control working conditions, including
"forms of employment other than open-ended contracts, such as fixed-term
contracts, part-time working, temporary work, and seasonal work" 12 1 In
an attempt to implement this policy, on August 13, 1990, the Commission
issued a proposal for a three-part directive on working conditions. The
proposal was not called for under the 1989 Social Action Program. The
three parts are titled the Proposal for a Council Directive on Certain
Employment Relationships with Regard to Working Conditions,' 22 the Pro-
posal for a Council Directive on Certain Employment Relationships with
Regard to Distortions of Competition, 123 and the Proposal for a Council
Directive Supplementing the Measures to Encourage Improvements in the
Safety and Health of Temporary Workers. 124 In 1991, the Council
approved the final proposal on temporary workers,' 25 but the first two pro-
posals remain pending.
The first proposal, on employment relationships, involves part-time
and temporary (seasonal and fixed duration) employment. This instru-
ment would require EU employers to treat their part-time and temporary
staff "on the same footing as ... other employees" as regards access to
vocational training, worker representation, benefits, social services, and
internal promotions to full-time or indefinite-duration positions. 126
The second work conditions proposal, defining employment relation-
ships with regard to distortions of competition, involves limited-term con-
tracts. 127 In Europe, even non-union job holders typically are parties to
written employment contracts of indefinite duration which elevate many
Change, Some Countries Discover They Are Not as Tolerant of Foreign Cultures as They
Once Thought They Were, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 36. But cf. Proposal for a Council
Decision Establishing a Medium-Term Community Action Programme to Foster the Eco-
nomic and Social Integration of the Least Privileged Groups, 1989 OJ. (C 60) 15. In
Italy, total hourly compensation cost employers $19.51, but total hourly wages were only
$9.52. See Shlaes, supra note 3, at A18.
121. Charter, supra note 49, at 7-8.
122. Proposal for a Council Directive on Certain Employment Relationships with
Regard to Working Conditions, 1990 OJ. (C 224) 4 [hereinafter Relationships
Proposal].
123. Proposal for a Council Directive on Certain Employment Relationships with
Regard to Distortions of Competition, 1990 OJ. (C 224) 6 [hereinafter Distortions
Proposal].
124. Proposal for a Council Directive Supplementing the Measures to Encourage
Improvements in the Safety and Health of Temporary Workers, 1990 OJ. (C 224) 8
[hereinafter Temporary Workers Directive].
125. Directive 91/383, 1991 OJ. (L 206) 19.
126. Relationships Proposal, supra note 122, art. 2. For a summary of laws regulating
part-time work within the member states, see EUROPEAN FoUNDATION FOR maE IMPROVE-
MENT OF LING AND WORKING CONDITIONS, PART-Tim WoRK IN THE EU: LAWS AND REGU-
LATIONS (1991). See generally Council Directive 93/104 Concerning Certain Aspects of
the Organization of Working Time, 1994 OJ. (L 307) 18.
127. Distortions Proposal, supra note 123, art. 1.
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important aspects of employment relationships-including the terms of dis-
charge--to the level of law. EU workers employed under these contracts
either keep their jobs as long as they want or else are bought out at a high
price. Not surprisingly, given the oppressive effects of such contracts on
employers, European employers occasionally offer their workers definite
length contracts with specific termination dates (usually one year from the
date of contracting). These employers typically renew the contracts annu-
ally until the employer decides upon discharge. In an attempt to rectify
this practice, the "distortions of competition" proposal would prohibit EU
employers from using fixed-term contracts for periods greater than thirty-
six months. 128
Complementing this work contracts proposal, in November 1990 the
Commission issued another, entirely separate draft directive which would
require employers to put all employment contracts in writing, defining the
applicable working conditions and the duration of the contract. 129 In
October 1991, the Council adopted a revised version of this directive, mak-
ing this requirement one of the first pre-Maastricht directives adopted
under the Social Action Program and effective in all Member States.130
This revised directive, effective since June 30, 1993, requires that virtually
all employers of Europeans provide each full-time employee, within two
months of employment, with a writing that states: the employers' identity,
the time and hours of work, the employee's job duties and classification,
the duration of employment if temporary, the applicable vacation policy,
pre-termination notice policy, compensation and pay schedule, and, where
appropriate, citations to applicable collective bargaining agreements.' 31 If
the employee is to be assigned abroad as an expatriate, the writing must
also address the duration of the foreign posting, the currency to be used for
payment, the "benefits in cash or kind attendant on the employment
abroad," and the conditions of repatriation.' 32
The third part of the Commission's tripartite working conditions pro-
posal is the directive on improving the health and safety of temporary
workers. 133 This directive, which covers both part-time and temporary
128. Id. art. 4a. Surprisingly, while the Member States closely regulate individual
dismissals, EU-level social law has historically avoided this topic. The Social Action
Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 15, § 4.1.2, however, calls for a study of "national
rules and practices on individual dismissals."
129. Council Directive 91/533 on an Employer's Obligation to Inform Employees of
the Conditions Applicable to the Contract or Employment Relationship, 1991 Oj. (L
288) 32. See Council Directive 91/383 Supplementing the Measures to Encourage
Improvements in the Safety and Health at Work of Workers with a Fixed-Duration
Employment Relationship or a Temporary Employment Relationship, 1991 OJ. (L 206)
19.
130. Council Directive 91/533, supra note 129.
131. Id. art. II, § 2.
132. Id. art. IV, § 1. In 1993, the United Kingdom implemented this directive by
strengthening a 1978 U.K. law which requires employers to provide workers with writ-
ings containing detailed information. Compare U.K. Trade Union Reform and Employ-
ment Rights Act 1993 with U.K. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.
133. Temporary Workers Directive, supra note 124.
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employment, requires employers to articulate in their assignment contracts
detailed job descriptions setting out the hours of work and indicating
"whether the job falls within the category of major risks as defined in
national legislation."134 The directive also requires employers to warn
workers about the risks involved in "any activity requiring special occupa-
tional qualifications or skills." 135 "If necessary," employers have to provide
temporary workers with "appropriate training."136
An entirely separate instrument on working conditions-which the
Commission proposed in November 1991, the EU Parliament supported on
March 11, 1992 by a non-binding vote, and the Council approved on June
24, 1992-amends and expands a 1975 directive which required employers
of twenty or more employees to give advance notice to their workers of
plant closings and mass layoffs, and to bargain with workers over these
changes. 137 The 1992 directive, plugging what the Commission termed a
legal loophole, applies the 1975 directive to conglomerates headquartered
either in one Member State or outside the European Union, but laying off
workers in another.138 According to the EU social mavens, the loophole
was that the 1975 instrument did not apply to a multinational corporation
which decided at its headquarters to dismiss a large contingency of work-
ers in a different state, and keep local management in the other state igno-
rant about the impending reduction in force.
Under the new directive, home offices must supply to local manage-
ment, for transmittal to workers or their representatives:
(i) [T]he reasons for the projected redundancies, (ii) the number [and] cate-
gories of workers to be made redundant, (iii) the number and categories of
workers normally employed, (iv) the period over which the projected redun-
dancies are to be effected, (v) the criteria proposed for the selection of the
workers to be made redundant in so far as national legislation and/or prac-
tice confers the power therefor upon the employer, [and] (vi) the method for
calculating any redundancy payments other than those arising out of a
national legislation and/or practice. 139
The motive for the new plant closing proposal was the Commission's fear
of a trend toward the acceleration of corporate restructuring: "[Ain
increasing number of employees will be affected by key corporate decisions
taken at a level higher than their immediate employer, i.e., by the undertak-
134. Id. art. 2.
135. Id. art. 5.
136. Id.
137. The 1975 directive, Directive 75/129, 1975 OJ. (L 48) 29, was the model for
similar but less forceful legislation that the United States adopted in 1988. Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification [WARN] Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1996).
This 1991 amending proposal-the Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive
75/129/EEU on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Collec-
tive Redundancies, COM(91)292 final [hereinafter Collective Redundancies Proposal]-
became a Council-approved directive, Directive 92/56, 1992 OJ. (L 245) 3 [hereinafter
Collective Redundancies Directive].
138. Collective Redundancies Proposal, supra note 137, at 15.
139. Collective Redundancies Directive, supra note 137, art. 2, § 3.
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 29
ing's head office, if located in a different country." 140
Another directive on work conditions regulates work time. This law
establishes rules regarding total hours, Sunday work, vacation, time off,
and overtime, and imposes a cap of forty-eight hours on the weekly amount
of time someone can work 1 4 1 Originally Britain strongly opposed this
instrument and filed a challenge in the European Court of Justice, arguing
that the health and safety characterization was improper. 14 2 The Council
ultimately did pass this directive in late 1993, creating a European right to
an annual four-week paid vacation.143
Commissioner Flynn's Social Action Program 1995-1997 keeps alive
the prospect of legislating other work condition issues which are still being
debated among the Member States. Potentially the farthest-reaching devel-
opment in the Program 1995-1997 is its call for a detailed study of a possi-
ble EU instrument on individual dismissals" 44 For many years, the
individual Member States have had highly protective regimes limiting an
employer's right to fire workers and requiring severance pay, but this
instrument would be the first European-level initiative in this area.
D. Right to Social Protection
The Charter's fourth right of social protection guarantees "an adequate
level of social security" for all Europeans and "sufficient resources and
social assistance" for the unemployed.' 45 By U.S. standards, Europe has a
generous level of social welfare protection, but the special benefits vary
greatly among the Member States:
Unemployed, disabled, sick, a single parent? Best then to be a Belgian, Dane,
or German, and worst to be British. If you are 18 and out of work, try to be
in Portugal, not Greece. If you are a widow with two children, try to be in
Spain rather than Italy. True, all... members of the European Union pro-
vide financial cushions for citizens in need-indeed, spending on social pro-
tection ranges from around 20% of GDP in Greece to over 30% in Holland-
but some cushions are more comfortable than others. 14 6
140. Collective Redundancies Proposal, supra note 137, at 4.
141. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Certain Aspects of the Organiza-
tion of Working Time, 1991 OJ. (L 24) 4. Certain classes of workers are excepted from
the time restrictions, including hospital workers, transportation workers, firefighters,
andjournalists. For a discussion of work time laws in the Member States, see LEGAL AND
CoNTRACTuAL LIMITATIONS TO WomaN-Tm IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEMBER
STATES (R. Blanpain & E. Koher eds., 1988).
142. Under the Treaty, proposals involving "the rights and interests of employed per-
sons" can be approved only by a unanimous Council vote, except that proposals involv-
ing health and safety may be passed by a mere qualified majority vote. EC TREATY, supra
note 19, arts. 100, 100a, 118a. See supra notes 40-41. This inevitably leads to character-
ization disputes. See Dowling, supra note 47, at 593-94. See, e.g., infra note 169 and
accompanying text.
143. Council Directive Concerning Certain Aspects of the Organization of Working
Time, 1993 OJ. (L 307) 18.
144. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 15, § 4.1.2.
145. Social Charter, supra note 49, 1 10.
146. The Enlightened Welfare-Seeker's Guide to Europe, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1994, at
57.
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Brussels has long supported the European Social Fund, which now
has an annual budget of about 5 billion ecu allocated to programs support-
ing workers' geographic and social mobility. 14 7 EU legislation under the
right to social protection would add more benefits, going beyond those pro-
vided by the Social Fund and extending, for example, to pension regula-
tion. The social protection right would also coordinate the existing EU
welfare systems and guarantee Europeans a minimum sustenance-level ben-
efit. Another goal is to harmonize pensions, allowing pension funds to
invest freely across Member State lines, and facilitating the beneficiaries'
ability to collect benefits across Member State lines.
As part of the social protection agenda, Commissioner Flynn's Social
Action Program 1995-1997 struggles to add the philosophically distinct
goal of fighting "racism, xenophobia and anti-semitism."148 However, in
the reserved fashion which characterizes the Program 1995-1997, Flynn
suggests nothing more specific than designating 1997 as the "European
Year Against Racism." 14 9
E. Right to Collective Bargaining
The fifth section of the Charter calls for a right to collective bargaining. 5 0
Since 1977, an important EU directive has regulated certain collective-bar-
gaining rights applicable within the Member States.' 5 ' However, no EU
legislation has yet elevated collective bargaining to the EU level. The Single
European Act, the Charter, and the 1989 Social Action Program all openly
encourage bargaining at the European level,' 5 2 but these earlier documents
fail to explain precisely what European level bargaining means.
During 1991, the European employers' group UNICE15 3 reinvigorated
the EU-wide collective bargaining concept by indicating that UNICE itself
might initiate European-level collective bargaining to forestall intrusive EU-
wide employment regulation.' 5 4 Building upon UNICE's willingness to
come to the bargaining table, the Maastricht Treaty's Social Protocol gives
the social partners a formal role in creating EU social law through collec-
tive bargaining on legislation.' 5 5
The Social Action Program 1995-1997 addresses this linkage between
EU-wide collective bargaining and EU social regulation. The document
147. EC TRATY, supra note 19, art. 123.
148. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 24-25, § 6.5.
149. Id.
150. Social Charter, supra note 49, c l 11-14.
151. The Acquired Rights Directive (also referred to as the Transfer of Undertakings
Directive) effectively renders a buyer of a business liable for all the seller's employment
contracts and prohibits the buyer from instituting layoffs except where "economic, tech-
nical or organizational reasons [exist] entailing changes in the work force." Council
Directive 77/187, 1977 Oj. (L 61) 26.
152. Single European Act, supra note 39, art. 22; Social Charter, supra 49, CI 12; 1989
Social Action Program, supra note 49, at 30.
153. Union des Conf~darations de l'Industrie et des Employeurs d'Europe.
154. See European Employers' Group Considering Trans-European Collective Bargaining,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 75, at A-5 (Apr. 18, 1991).
155. See discussion supra part III.C.
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promises "a Communication addressing the entire area of implementation
of Community directives by collective agreements,"' s 6 and also promises
that a "clause concerning implementation by collective agreements will be
inserted in all future directives .. 5.. ,,-7
F. Right to Vocational Training
Brussels envisions a skilled work force staffing its post-1992 EU workplace.
Accordingly, the sixth section of the Charter attempts to improve worker
skills by creating a right to lifetime vocational training.158 At a June 1,
1993 meeting of the EU Council of Ministers, the Social Affairs Ministers
reaffirmed their strong commitment to vocational training. Indeed, voca-
tional training has long been a Brussels priority. Europe supports an
important and long-established program, the European Social Fund,
charged with training workers.' 5 9
The text of the Charter seems to call for privately-financed vocational
training programs, but Brussels apparently could not resist expanding its
Community-financed vocational training schemes. In December 1990, the
Community devised "Euroform," which establishes a "Community initia-
tive concerning the new qualifications, new skills and new employment
opportunities induced by the completion of the internal market and techno-
logical change."160 Euroform, which unapologetically reinforces six other
similar programs, imposed a 300 million ecu cost on the Union's structural
funds for the period between 1990 and 1993. The Member States are
responsible for co-financing the program by contributing additional
money.' 61
With the same goal in mind, in June 1994 the Council members
arrived at a common position on the "Leonardo da Vinci" vocational train-
ing program, effective through the end of 1999.162 This ambitious plan
supports a two-year initial vocational training period followed by lifelong
training.163
The Social Action Program 1995-1997 contains many non-controver-
sial-but undoubtedly expensive-ideas to increase Europe's already-sub-
stantial level of vocational training. In typical fashion, the Program
announced that the Commission would issue in 1995 a White Paper enti-
156. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 32, § 11.1.9 (emphasis
added).
157. Id. at 32, § 11.1.10.
158. Social Charter, supra note 49, l 15.
159. EC TRE.ATY, supra note 19, arts. 123-27.
160. Notice to the Member States Laying Down Guidelines for Operational Program-
mes/Global Grants Which Member States Are Invited to Establish, in the Framework of
a Community Initiative Concerning New Qualifications, New Skills, and New Employ-
ment Opportunities--Euroform Initiative, 1990 Oj. (L 32) 3.
161. Id.
162. Press Release on Labour and Social Affairs, Council of the EU General Secretariat,
1775th mtg., Doc. No. 7975/94 (Presse 134), at 14 (June 22, 1994) (Luxembourg) [here-
inafter Press Release]. The Leonardo da Vinci program took effect in December 1994.
163. Id.
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tled "Education and Training, The Levers of the Year 2000."164
G. Right to Equal Treatment Between Men and Women
As its seventh right, the Charter seeks to outlaw sex discrimination in
employment. This prohibition has existed for years within the internal
laws of Member States and also under Community law.1 65 To further this
right, on October 17, 1990, the Commission issued a Proposal for a Coun-
cil Directive Concerning the Protection at Work of Pregnant Women or
Women Who Have Recently Given Birth.16 6 Although this proposal
encountered strong initial resistance, the Council of Ministers approved a
less radical version of this instrument, making this the first noteworthy
piece of 1989 Social Action Program legislation to receive Council
approval.' 6 7
The maternity directive addresses two disparate maternity issues:
safety (exposure to agents causing potential fetal harm) and leave (time off
for childbirth and breastfeeding). The instrument first requires Member
States to protect pregnant and breast-feeding women by forcing employers
to eliminate all dangerous physical, chemical, and biological agents on
their jobs;16 8 the document specifies precisely which agents Member
States must outlaw. 16 9 The instrument also requires Member States to
ensure that some alternative to night work is available to pregnant women
for the sixteen weeks before their expected delivery date.' 70
Secondly, the directive acknowledges that the average legally-man-
dated maternity paid leave within the twelve Member States was fifteen
weeks, with minimum and maximum periods of twelve and forty weeks
respectively.' 7 ' Notwithstanding the Member States' existing protection
levels, the first draft of the maternity proposal had required those pregnant
women who inform employers of their pregnancy in advance to receive "an
uninterrupted period of at least fourteen weeks' leave from work on full pay
and/or a corresponding allowance, commencing before and ending after
164. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 11, § 2.2.1.
165. Social Charter, supra note 49, cl 17. The original version of the EC Treaty man-
dated "equal [pay] for equal work" EC Tumary, supra note 19, art. 119. Since 1975,
Brussels has been harmonizing laws on equal pay and equal treatment. See, e.g., Coun-
cil Directive 75/117 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to
the Application of the Principle of Equal Pay for Men and Women, 1975 OJ. (L 45) 19;
Council Directive 76/207 on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for
Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, Vocational Training and Promotion
and Working Conditions, 1976 OJ. (L 39) 39.
166. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection at Work of Pregnant
Women or Women Who Have Recently Given Birth, 1990 OJ. (C 281) 1.
167. Directive 92/85 of 19 Oct. 1992, 1992 OJ. (L 348) 1.
168. Id. art 4.
169. Id. Annex I. The drafters of the instrument included a health and safety compo-
nent with the hope of attaining a qualified majority, not unanimous, Council vote. See
supra text accompanying notes 40-41, 142.
170. Id. art. 3, 1 3.
171. Id. For a discussion of maternity leave in the Member States, see Health Care, A
Look at all the Systems in EC Countries, EuR-, Apr. 1993, at 14.
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delivery." 172 However, the Council then withdrew the requirement setting
leave pay at full salary. In a classic example of Brussels' pattern of watering
down social instruments to win broader support, the approved directive
dictates that leave pay need only equal the rate of sick pay, which in
Europe generally is seventy-five percent of full pay. Still, any actual sick-
ness leave a woman takes during her pregnancy is in addition to her guar-
anteed maternity leave. Member States remain free to mandate more than
fourteen weeks leave "not on full pay, as long as an equivalent standard of
protection is assured." 173
The maternity instrument also prohibits employers from discriminat-
ing against pregnant women. 174 The directive places the burden of proof
on employers to disprove that any adverse employment action they took
was on account of an employee's pregnancy. 175 This system is actually
more flexible than the doctrine in certain Member States, including Italy,
which flatly prohibits discharging pregnant women regardless of the rea-
son or quality of proof.176
During 1991, the Commission also issued a proposed recommenda-
tion on child care-ultimately approved by the Council in 1992-which
strongly urged the Member States to create comprehensive child care pro-
grams for working parents. 177 Also during 1991, the Commission issued
and the Council approved a recommendation for an anti-harassment mea-
sure designed to protect the dignity of men and women at work.' 78
The Maastricht Treaty provides another development in the equal
treatment of men and women under the law. Article 119 of the EC Treaty
established the right to equal pay for equal work, and a substantial body of
case law and commentary has arisen under it.1 79 One controversial 1990
European Court of Justice decision, the Barber case, extended the equal
pay concept to cover benefits under occupational social security
172. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection at Work of Pregnant
Women or Women Who Have Recently Given Birth, COM(90)406 final SYN 303, § III,
art. 5, l 1.
173. Council Directive 92/85, supra note 167, art. 3, cl 2.
174. Id. art. 10(2).
175. Id. See also Case 177/88, Dekker v. VJV-Centrum, [1991] IRLR 27 (1991); Case
179/88, Hertz v. Aldi Marked K/S, [1991] IRLR 31 (1991).
176. Italy also allows paternity leave. See Paternity Leave, EuR., June 1993, at 43.
177. Council Recommendation 92/241 on Child Care, 1992 Oj. (L 123) 16.
178. Commission Recommendation on the Protection of the Dignity of Men and
Women at Work, 1991 Oj. (C 27) 4, (incorporating Code of Practice on Measures to
Combat Sexual Harassment); Council Declaration on the Implementation of the Com-
mission Recommendation on the Protection of the Dignity of Women and Men at Work,
1991 Oj. (C 27) 1. See also COM(91)232 final; Council Recommendation 92/131,
1992 Oj. (L 49) 1; Council Resolution 390 Y 0627 (05), 1996 Oj. (C 157) 3 (on "pro-
tection of the dignity of women and men at work"); Victoria A. Carter, Working on Dig-
nity: EU Initiatives on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 12 Nw. J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 431
(1992).
179. EC TRE.aY, supra note 19, art. 119. See, e.g., Rosa Greaves, Article 119 and Its
Interpretation by the European Court of Justice, 33 N. IRELAND L.Q. 199 (1982).
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schemes.' 80 This case had a negative effect on longstanding EU benefit
plans, imposing substantial new costs. In an attempt to appease both
sides, the Maastricht Treaty includes a special Protocol Concerning Article
119 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, mandating that
in most cases Barber will apply prospectively only and therefore not dis-
turbing pension rights before the date of that decision.' 8 '
Commissioner Flynn's Social Action Program 1995-1997 contains an
independent section addressing equal opportunity for men and women,
but it proposes no radical action.' 8 2 Most significantly, the Flynn docu-
ment suggests shifting the burden of proof in sex discrimination and equal
pay cases to require employers to prove affirmatively that they had not vio-
lated the law.' 83 As a separate development, in June 1994 the Council
approved a Resolution on the Promotion of Equal Opportunities for Men
and Women through Action by the European Structural Funds.' 8 4
H. Right to Worker Consultation and Participation in Management
The Charter's most controversial proposal is its eighth guarantee of worker
access to management information and worker participation in corporate
affairs affecting employment. 185 Certain Northern European Member
States' national labor law systems-most notably Germany's-have long
ceded generous management participation rights to labor. The Northern
European worker consultation and participation concept encompasses
worker rights to information, consultation, and true participation in man-
agement decisions. Under these systems, labor representatives get advance
notice of management's plans that would affect the workplace; labor then
has a chance to consult and participate in management affairs that affect
employment, including corporate mergers, technological changes, restruc-
turings of operations, and transfrontier employment issues.186
As originally envisioned under the EU's Vredeling Proposal and pro-
posed Fifth Company Law Directive, EU-wide worker participation was to
180. Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Group, 1 E.C.R. 1889
(1990). On September 28, 1994, the Court of Justice fleshed out the Barber doctrine by
issuing six more decisions on this topic. See Case C-200/91, Colorall Pension Trustees
Ltd. v. Russell, 1995 All E.R. (EC) 23; Case C-408/92, Smith v. Avdel Systems Ltd., 1995
All E.R. (EC) 132; Case C-7/93, Bestuur van het Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds v.
Beune, 1995 All E.R. (EC) 97; Case C-28/93, Van Den Akker v. Stichting Shell Pen-
sioenfonds, 1995 All E.R. (EC) 156; Case C-57/93, Fisscher v. Voorhuis Hengelo BV,
1995 All E.R. (EC) 193; Case C-128/93, Fisscher v. Voorhuis Hengelo BV, 1993 Oj. (C
131) 5.
181. Protocol Concerning Article 119 of the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 LL.M. 331.
182. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 19-21, § 5.
183. Id. at 20, § 5.1.4. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (regarding the
employer's burden of proof in pregnancy discrimination cases).
184. Press Release, supra note 162, Annex.
185. Social Charter, supra note 49, cTI 17-18 (the approved text of the Charter con-
tains two separate paragraphs numbered 17).
186. See, e.g., CoIuN GILL ET AL., WORKPLACE INVOLVEMENT IN TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVA-
TiON IN Th EC (1993); Michael Paolucci, Worker Participation; Its History and Its Future
(May 1, 1990) (unpublished manuscript).
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be a "rider" directive accompanying a procedure for EU-wide corporate sta-
tus.18 7 The theory behind the proposal was that a single European corpo-
rate status would affirmatively benefit businesses. To charge companies
for this benefit, Brussels tried to add worker participation to the EU-wide
incorporation mechanism. Mixing labor and corporation law, this rider
model would have tied worker participation to EU-wide corporate status,
forcing those companies that wanted a single European corporate presence
to adopt the EU's worker participation provisions into their articles of
incorporation. 18 8
The Charter and 1989 Social Action Program, however, ignored the
long-proposed link between EU worker participation and company law.
Instead, the Charter called for an unrestricted right of worker consultation
and participation for employees of large corporations operating in more
than one Member State. 189 To effectuate this right, the 1989 Social Action
Program proposed an instrument which would establish "equivalent sys-
tems of worker participation in all European-scale enterprises." 190
Employers would be forced to provide their workers with general and peri-
odic information regarding those aspects of company development affect-
ing employment.' 91 Trans-European employers would have to consult with
worker representatives "before taking any decision liable to have serious
consequences for the interests of employees, in particular, closures, trans-
fers, curtailment of activities, substantial changes with regard to organiza-
tion, working practices, production methods, long term cooperation and
other undertakings." 192
On January 25, 1991, acting under this section of the 1989 Social
Action Program, the Commission proposed a directive entitled The Estab-
lishment of a European Works Council in Community-Scale Undertakings
or Groups of Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and Consulting
Employees.' 93 On September 16, 1991, the Commission updated this with
an Amended Proposal. 194 After substantial political wrangling, this propo-
sal was incorporated into the Works Council Directive, which was passed
187. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Procedures for Informing and
Consulting the Employees of Undertakings with Complex Structures in Particular Trans-
national Undertakings, 1980 OJ. (C 297) 33; Commission Proposal for a Fifth Com-
pany Law Directive, 1983 O.J. (C 240) 2. See also Commission Proposal for a Council
Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, 1989 Oj. (C 263) 41. See generally
R. BLANPAIN Er AL., THE VREDELING PROPOSAL, INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION OF EMPLOY-
EFs IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1983); Michael Nelson, The Vredeling Directive: The
EEC's Failed Attempt to Regulate Multinational Enterprises and Organize Collective Bar-
gaining, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 967 (1988).
188. See, e.g., COMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIEs, DIacToPAT-GENHERAL FOR
EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EDUCATION, SOCIAL EUROPE: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF
THE INERNAL MARIMT, SPECIAL EDITION 51-52, § 2.2.1.3 (1988).
189. Social Charter, supra note 49, 1 17.
190. 1989 Social Action Program, supra note 49, at 32-33.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 1991 Oj. (C 39) 1. The Parliament approved this draft on July 9, 1991.
194. 1991 Oj. (C 336) 1.
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by the Council in September 1994.195
The Works Council Directive was passed under the Maastricht Social
Protocol and therefore does not apply in the United Kingdom.19 6 The
directive is the single most controversial social instrument to pass under
the 1989 Social Charter, yet European trade unionists are uncomfortable
with it, because it was substantially altered after the initial draft.
The directive, slated for adoption in the Member States by September
22, 1996,197 covers only those EU employers "with at least 1000 employees
within the Member States," including at least 150 employees in each of at
least two Member States.198 The many smaller European employers not
meeting this high threshold remain subject to whatever applicable worker
participation law might apply in the Member States.19 9
The Works Council Directive requires the representatives of covered
employers to sit on an in-house labor/management committee, the Euro-
pean Works Council. This group meets regularly with management as a
special negotiating body, discussing issues affecting employment.200 Man-
agement must inform the Works Council "of the progress of the [undertak-
ing's] ... business.., and its prospects." 20 1 This information must
relate in particular to the [employer's] structure, economic and financial sit-
uation, the probable development of the business and of production and
sales, the situation and probable trend of employment and investments, and
substantial changes concerning organization, introduction of new working
methods of production, processes, transfers of production, mergers, cut-
backs or closures of undertakings, establishments or important parts
thereof, and collective redundancies [lay-offs]. 20 2
In his Social Action Program 1995-1997, Commissioner Flynn hints
that he will "initiate consultations with the social partners on the advisabil-
ity and possible direction of Community action in the field of information
and consultation of employees in national undertakings."20 3 Thus, Flynn
contemplates extending the Works Council concept to the Member State
level.
195. Council Directive 94/45 on the Establishment of a European Works Council or a
Procedure in Community-Scale Undertakings and Community-Scale Groups of Under-
takings for the Purposes of Informing and Consulting Employees, 1994 OJ. (L 254) 64
[hereinafter Works Council Directive].
196. Id. pmbl. To date this is the only instrument to pass under the Social Protocol.
See supra part III.C.
197. Id. art. 14.2.
198. Id. art. 2.1(c). This directive is estimated to cover as many as 1500 multinational
companies, including 200 U.S.-based businesses. BNA CoRp. CouNs. WKLy, June 29,
1994, at 7.
199. Germany and the Netherlands are the Member States with the farthest-reaching
national worker participation regimes. See, e.g., Gerhard Roder, Labor Law Implications
of the Restructuring of Enterprises in the Federal Republic of Germany, 28 Iur'L LAw. 331,
332-37 (1994).
200. Works Council Directive, supra note 195, art. 5(2).
201. Id. Annex, § 2.
202. Id.
203. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 16, § 4.2.4.
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Apart from the Works Council Directive, inJuly 1991 the Commission
also issued a proposal on employee profit participation.20 4 This legislation
was based upon Commission's Proposal for a Council Recommendation
Concerning the Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and Enter-
prise Results (including Equity Participation) 20 and was ultimately
adopted by the Council in 1992.206 This recommendation requests the
Member States to structure their legal systems in a way that encourages the
social partners to negotiate diverse types of voluntary employee profit par-
ticipation schemes, such as profit sharing, employee share ownership, and
stock option programs.20 7 Implicitly conceding that these schemes are
properly a product of free enterprise and not governmental regulation, this
instrument avoids any overt mandates. Instead, it seeks only to encourage
employer profit participation schemes by enhancing the social partners'
awareness of them. 20 8
I. Right to Health and Safety Protection in the Workplace
Another area in which European worker representatives have pressed for
comprehensive EU-level regulation is workplace health and safety, the topic
of the Charter's ninth right. This right is the least controversial aspect of
Europe's social agenda. Even UNICE identifies health and safety regula-
tion as an area in which employers believe European-level employment reg-
ulation is appropriate. Not surprisingly, substantial progress has occurred
in this area over the years. Twelve of the 1989 Social Action Program's
forty-seven proposals involved workplace health and safety, more than
under any other single Charter right.20 9 The Commission began issuing
these twelve specific proposals in 1990, when it put forth a draft directive
on safety at mobile work sites.210 Other proposed directives involved
safety on ships, industrial diseases, workplace exposure to asbestos, and a
"safety, hygiene and health agency."211 By their very specificity, these new
topics for safety legislation indicate that existing EU safety regulations
cover a substantially broad range of subjects. The Social Action Program
1995-1997 profers different but equally specific proposals on certain
hazards, including pollution-related diseases, rare diseases, and AIDS. 212
In June 1994, the Council agreed on a regulation establishing a European
204. 1989 Social Action Program, supra note 49, at 34; Proposal for a Council Recom-
mendation Concerning the Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and Enter-
prise Results (Including Equity Participation), 1991 OJ. (C 245) 12.
205. Id.
206. Council Recommendation 92/443, 1992 OJ. (L 245) 1.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See 1989 Social Action Program, supra note 49, at 45-49, 50-53. For citations to
the leading EU instruments on health and safety through 1990, see COMPENDIUM OF EC
EMPLOYMENT AND SocAL SEcur= LAW 295-597 (1990).
210. Council Directive on the Proposal for the Implementation of Minimum Safety
and Health Requirements at Temporary or Mobile Work Sites, COM(90)257 final.
211. One source collecting many of these health and safety instruments is C Aswaa
& DE SAFRAU, supra note 105, at 10/62-10/65.
212. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 25-26, §§ 7.1.2, 7.1.4, 7.2.1.
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Agency for Safety and Health at Work, a European counterpart to the
United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration, to be based
in Bilbao, Spain.21 3
J. Protection of Children and Adolescents
The Charter's final three rights grant affirmative protections to three
groups: the young, the old, and the handicapped. 2 14 The Charter's tenth
guarantee of protection for the young primarily addresses wage rates, voca-
tional training, and limits on child labor.2 15 Over the years, Brussels has
been vigilant in ensuring young peoples' access to vocational training.2 16
InJanuary 1992, the Commission issued its first social document after the
Maastricht Treaty summit, the proposal for a Directive on the Protection of
Young People at Work, which the full Council passed in June 1994.217
This instrument protects youth by eliminating most child labor and
restricting teenagers' work hours. Drafters of the Social Action Program
1995-1997 promise to issue in 1996 a policy to promote lifelong
learning.218
K. Protection of the Aged
As its eleventh right, the Charter grants affirmative rights to the aged, but
these rights focus on basic state-provided sustenance, not on employment
restrictions.21 9 Apart from pension regulation, social security coordina-
tion, and a few other areas, 220 ultimately Brussels' chief role regarding pro-
tection of older workers may be merely to coordinate propaganda stressing
the aged's concerns. To this end, the 1989 Social Action Program labeled
1993 "a year for the elderly."2 21 However, since then, the Social Action
Program 1995-1997 has added few, if any, new proposals granting rights
213. Press Release, supra note 162, at 11. In 1990 the Commission put forth a Propo-
sal for a Council Regulation Establishing a European Agency for Safety and Health at
Work, COM(90)564 final.
214. Social Charter, supra note 49, 11 20-26.
215. Id. 1% 20-23.
216. See e.g., Decision 63/266/EEC, 1964 OJ. (063) 1138; Decision 87/569/EEC,
1976 OJ. (L 346) 31; Council Resolution 476 Y 1230(01), 1976 OJ. (C 308) 1.
217. Press Release, supra note 162, at 3-5.
218. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 11, §§ 2.2.1, 2.2.3.
219. Social Charter, supra note 49, clI 24-25. The fact that the Charter's social protec-
tions for the aged appear to focus on state-run benefit programs is good news for
employers of Europeans, because this emphasis deflects the concerns which give rise to
the employer-restrictive U.S. model of affirmative anti-discrimination rights for the aged.
EU and Member State law is almost entirely devoid of prohibitions against age discrimi-
nation. Job advertisements in the European Union often openly list upper age limits.
See, e.g., David Guest, Are You Too Old to Be a Whiz Kid?, THE TwMEs (London), July 23,
1993, at 28; Age Discrimination in Employment, Benefits, Remain Common in Europe, 20
Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1489 (July 12, 1993). See generally Dowling, supra note 47, at
612 n.300; Dowling, supra note 64, at 24, n.139 (providing specific examples of job
advertisements at major European companies, including U.S.-based multinationals in
Europe, which include age limits).
220. See, e.g., Recommendation 82/857, 1992 OJ. (L 357) 27 (on retirement age).
221. 1989 Social Action Program, supra note 49, at 52.
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to older workers. 222
L. Protection of the Handicapped
Like its protections for the aged, the Charter's twelfth and final guarantee
of rights for the handicapped acts more as a statement of affirmative social
policy than as a body of anti-discrimination prohibitions directly affecting
employment. 223 The Charter and the 1989 Social Action Program's protec-
tions for the handicapped are essentially toothless and would not change
anything material about EU employment relationships. For example, in
1986 the Council adopted a mere recommendation supporting employ-
ment of the handicapped. 224
Brussels has taken great strides in the handicap area unrelated to
employment. In 1988, the Council adopted a community action program
intended to help integrate the handicapped socially. This program is enti-
tled "HELIOS," Handicapped People in the European Community Living
Independently in an Open Society.2 25 In 1991 the Commission proposed
expending the HELIOS program, and by 1993 the Council adopted a Deci-
sion Establishing a Third Community Action Program to Assist Disabled
People, HELIOS II (1992-96).226 HELIOS II improves computer databases
and other aids, and makes new information sources available to the handi-
capped. Additionally, the Council adopted two recommendations regard-
ing the improvement of assistance to handicapped children. 227 The Social
Action Program 1995-1997 seeks to continue HELIOS II beyond 1996 and
to pass instruments dealing with transportation (and even parking) for dis-
abled workers. 228
V. The Future of EU Employment Regulation
From the employer's perspective, the future of EU employment regulation-
i.e., the blueprint set out in the Charter, the 1989 Social Action Program,
the Commission's 1990-1991 package of draft instruments, the Maastricht
Social Protocol, and the Social Action Program 1995-1997-looks expen-
222. Cf. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 24, §§ 6.4.1-6.4.2. The
Social Action Program 1995-1997 does support a pending Proposal for a Council Deci-
sion on Community Support for Actions in Favour of Older People, COM(95)53.
223. Social Charter, supra note 49, 5 26.
224. Council Recommendation on the Employment of Disabled People in the Com-
munity, 1986 Oj. (L 225) 43.
225. Council Decision 88/231 Establishing a Second Community Action Programme
for Disabled People, 1988 Oj. (L 104) 38.
226. Council Directive 93/136, 1993 Oj. (L 56) 30.
227. Conclusions of the Council and the Ministers of Education Meeting Within the
Council Concerning a Programme of European Collaboration on the Integration of
Handicapped Children into Ordinary Schools, 1987 Oj. (C 211) 1; Resolution of the
Council and the Ministers of Council Meeting Within the Council Concerning Integra-
tion of Children and Young People with Disabilities into Ordinary Systems of Education,
1990 Oj. (C 162) 2.
228. Social Action Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 23-24, §§ 6.3.1, 6.3.3. The
Program 1995-1997 also calls for a "code of good practice on the employment of dis-
abled people within the Commission." Id. at 24, § 6.3.2 (emphasis added).
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sive. European employers already pay some of the highest pay and benefit
levels in the world. Many European Member States' wages exceed rates in
the United States, and benefit costs are so high in Europe that in some
Member States they exceed one hundred percent of wage costs. 22 9 Once
the Social Action Program 1995-1997 is fully implemented (throughout the
entire Union or in the Member States other than Britain), European work-
ers' wages and benefits may well rise even higher.
Nevertheless, the social Europe program sends employers some posi-
tive signals through what it omits. The Social Charter and the social docu-
ments it spawned are virtually silent on the employment doctrine which
worries U.S. employers most: anti-discrimination law.2 30 With the con-
spicuous exception of sex discrimination, the social Europe agenda omits
anti-discrimination protections for racial minorities, religions, and,
notwithstanding the Charter rights to protection for the aged and the hand-
icapped, these groups as well. 2 31
Whether Brussels will realize its goal of using social legislation to cre-
ate a fairer, more cohesive European Union-a "people's Europe'-or
whether, conversely, Brussels will decide that a competitive economy pre-
cludes broad European-level labor law, remains an open question. The
trend, however, is clear. Since 1989, Brussels' social agenda has grown
from a guarded secret into the next big frontier of EU regulation.
229. See supra notes 3, 120.
230. See 1989 Social Action Program, supra note 49, at 5 ("the Commission is not
making a proposal in respect of discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or
religion").
231. Brussels' omission of race discrimination prohibitions from its social agenda is
particularly noteworthy, given the extreme racial tensions which have arisen in Ger-
many, France, and Italy. The United Kingdom is virtually the only member state with
any national laws against race discrimination. Cynics, especially in the United King-
dom, believe that migrant-related race problems on the continent are so severe that anti-
race-discrimination legislation would be politically intolerable. Perhaps signaling
change, the Social Action Program 1995-1997, for the first time in any major Brussels
social document, does raise the issue of a race discrimination agenda. Social Action
Program 1995-1997, supra note 21, at 24, § 6.5.1-6.5.3. It does so, however, only in a
tentative way, without calling for any prohibition on race discrimination in employment.

